Espania Online

Organizational theory: leadership

Administrator — Tue, 16 Jun 2009 10:09:10 +0000

One of the oldest theorists of leadership in world literature is Machiavelli (1468-1527). He described certain effective techniques for manipulation and remaining in power (including deceit, bribery, and murder) that gave him a bad reputation in later centuries. Machiavelli wrote in the context of the Italy of his day, and what he described is clearly a large Power Distance situation. We still find Italy on the larger Power Distance side of Figure 5 (with all other Latin and Mediterranean countries), and we can assume from historical evidence that Power Distances in Italy during the sixteenth century were considerably larger than they are now. When we compare Machiavelli’s work with that of his contemporary, Sir Thomas More (1478-1535), we find cultural differences between ways of thinking in different countries even in the sixteenth century. The British More described in Utopia a state based on consensus as a “model” to criticize the political situation of his day. But practice did not always follow theory, of course: More, deemed too critical, was beheaded by order of King Henry VIII, while Machiavelli the realist managed to die peacefully in his bed. The difference in theories is nonetheless remarkable. perfectresume.Org: we deliver resume and cover letter help by educated resume writers! Get your professional resume in 24 hours only! In the United States a current of leadership theories has developed. Some of the best known were put forth by the late Douglas McGregor (Theory X versus Theory Y), Rensis Likert (System 4 management), and Robert R. Blake with Jane S. Mouton (the Managerial Grid®). What these theories have in common is that they all advocate participation in the manager’s decisions by his/her subordinates (participative management); however, the initiative toward participation is supposed to be taken by the manager. In a worldwide perspective (Figure 5), we can understand these theories from the middle position of the United States on the Power Distance side (rank 15 out of 40 countries). Had the culture been one of larger Power Distance, we could have expected more “Machiavellian” theories of leadership. In fact, in the management literature of another country with a larger Power Distance index score, France, there is little concern with participative management American style, but great concern with who has the power. However, in countries with smaller Power Distances than the United States (Sweden, Norway, Germany, Israel), there is considerable sympathy for models of management in which even the initiatives are taken by the subordinates (forms of industrial democracy) and with which there’s little sympathy in the United States. In the approaches toward “industrial democracy” taken in these countries, we notice their differences on the second dimension, Uncertainty Avoidance. In weak Uncertainty Avoidance countries like Sweden, industrial democracy was started in the form of local experiments and only later was given a legislative framework. In strong Uncertainty Avoidance countries like Germany, industrial democracy was brought about.

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Administrator — Tue, 12 May 2009 11:03:41 +0000

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The Most Important Country in Latin America

Administrator — Fri, 01 Aug 2008 13:31:59 +0000

Economically, the most important country in Latin America today is Brazil. The "economic miracle" there faded in 1974. Since then, there has been continual talk about changing the economic model to one that would give renewed emphasis to the expansion of the internal market. But the feasibility of such a change is doubtful for both national and international economic and political reasons. Marini observes that Brazil’s present model of capital accumulation and participation in the international division of labor is based on luxury consumption, exports, and state purchases. Only the second and third categories offer any significant or substantial escape from the renewed crisis of Brazilian capital accumulation; and part of the first may have to be sacrificed to the other two. But ultimately, the extent to which exports remain an important motor force of accumulation and economic activity in the Third World depends not only on how much anyone in the Third World wants to export, but also on how much the rest of the world wants to import.

In Africa military regimes are the rule and in 1978 only three countries ( Gambia, Botswana, and Mauritius) out of the fifty members of the Organization of African Unity were said to have had functioning multiparty governments. Military coups have been commonplace since independence. But recently there have been some moves in the direction of "democratization" or institutionalization of state rule in Africa, especially in western Africa. Senegal is "edging toward a multiparty state." Referendums and other moves toward elections and civilian (or civilianmilitary or military-backed "civilian") governments took place in 1979 in Upper Volta, Ghana, and Nigeria. But all these states have imposed severe limitations on their "democracy." In Upper Volta the number of political parties is limited by the constitution. Before the coup by Lieutenant Rawlins in Ghana the military government presented voters with a Hobson’s choice between a civil-military "union government" without political parties and an alternative that left its own perpetuation or parliamentary choices undefined. After fraudulent balloting in which the military government supposedly received a 54 percent majority, opposition leaders were rounded up and put in jail. The progressive Rawlins coup altered the pre-electoral power alignment in Ghana, and yet the government that emerged from the elections continues the same export promotion policy as its predecessors. In Nigeria electoral plans were designed to exclude regional or tribal parties, and other restrictions and prospects made some labor union leaders fearful that they and their worker constituents would fare even worse after elections. The elected civilian government has pursued essentially the same economic policies as its military predecessors, except of course that economic circumstances no longer permit the previous spending spree. Thus, despite deceiving appearances, there "is no sudden blossoming of democracy in Africa" after all.

The third question posed above was what alternative international division of labor may be in the offing and what prospects it may offer for the modification of political regimes and state forms in Third World countries. One of these alternatives is a renewed turn to protectionism by the industrial nations.

Military Spokesman for “Democracy”

Administrator — Fri, 01 Aug 2008 13:31:46 +0000

In Chile Air Force General Leigh became a military spokesman for "democracy" after having been the most outspoken member of the junta for fascist policies and groups. The Christian Democrats, led by ex-President Frei, also rediscovered the virtues of "democracy" after having plotted for and welcomed General Pinochet’s military coup and regime. In a blog of political reflections Eduardo Frei made it clear, however, that a return to the sort of democracy that existed before the coup — even during his own presidency — is out of the question and that much more authoritarianism is the order of the day. The Chilean economic program of Frei and his political and economic allies (which include U.S capital and the U.S. government) proposed that the recently neglected industrial bourgeoisie should be given more participation and a greater share of the profits — as part of essentially the same export-oriented economic model that the junta has imposed. Even the economic program of the Popular Unity parties, which had formed the Allende government that Pinochet so brutally overthrew, reserves a most important place for new exports and foreign investment in the Chilean economy. The Popular Unity and Christian Democratic economic programs for a future Chile under their hoped-for rule (jointly or separately) are remarkably similar in most respects; although the Christian Democratic program appears more restrictive with regard to foreign investment than the Communist-Socialist Popular Unity program!. The Popular Unity parties, of course, do not have much hope for significant participation in any foreseeable future government in Chile. What can be expected from a military-civilian coalition government with Christian Democratic or even some Popular Unity participation? Only maintenance of the same export-promoting economic model with some cosmetic improvements and/or modifications to widen its foreign and domestic economic and political support. And although the population would suffer less political repression, its economic fortunes would not improve much.

Radical Economic Departures

Administrator — Fri, 01 Aug 2008 13:31:02 +0000

The most radical new economic departures with the most brutal political repression have been in Latin America. It is there that the domestic market, worker income, consumer purchasing power, and local manufacturing sales have been most violently sacrificed to the new model of export promotion. Is a degree of political liberalization or even democratization in Latin America likely to effect the abandonment of this model? Or is the same economic model likely to be extended and refined through greater foreign investment attracted by the new political "stability"? And would greater domestic political support for this economic model be won by permitting wider bourgeois participation in its benefits — that is, profits — once the model has been made to operate more steadily? Our analysis of the political economy of export promotion today, and at least circumstantial evidence of who is promoting what changes in some of the countries of Latin America, suggest an answer to the second question: Forseeable political changes are not likely to replace, but to consolidate the present economic model. In Argentina, for instance, a spokesman for "democracy" has been Admiral Massera, whose navy has been the most hard-line representative of the interests of the landed oligarchy. A fundamental change of policy by Massera and those he represents would really be a case of the leopard changing his spots. President Videla may be able to keep the army hard liners at bay (though it is still quite possible that the hard line Viola faction will topple him). And he may, like President Llanusse before him, be able to arrange some sort of military-civilian coalition government. But the essential economic policy of the Argentine state is not like to change. We may agree with Latin American Political Report when it suggests that "the return to democracy will involve a civilian-military political structure in which ultimate control will rest with the military. The process will require a long period of transition. . . . The army is also seeking as a prior condition to implementation of its plan that there should be no major modification of the economic strategy of José Martinez de Hoz until 1980 at the earliest. This does not, however, mean that the minister himself must remain at his post."